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ABSTRACT 
UNDER SUPREME COURT REVIEW: 
AN EVALUATION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 1994-2005 
by 
Matthew Coker 
University of New Hampshire, September 2012 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is one of the most 
controversial courts in the United States due, in large part, to its high rate of reversal 
by the United States Supreme Court. The existing scholarship advances several 
potential explanations for the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate, particularly the Ninth 
Circuit's reputation as a very liberal court. This study evaluates the Ninth Circuit 
cases reviewed by the Supreme Court during the 1994-2004 terms to determine 
whether there are explanatory patterns to the Supreme Court's disposition of cases 
from the Ninth Circuit over time. Examining the effects of the membership of the 
original three-judge panel, the presence of a government appellant, and the 
application of the due process guarantees, this study identifies substantial differences 
between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT CONTROVERSY 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is one of the most 
controversial courts in the United States. The Ninth Circuit has a higher rate of reversal 
by the Supreme Court than any other circuit court.1 The Ninth Circuit also leads the 
federal appeals courts in the number of summary reversals (Supreme Court reversals 
without briefing or oral arguments) and unanimous reversals.2 Assessing the Ninth 
Circuit's performance, Supreme Court Justice Scalia stated in his letter to the White 
Commission that there is a "disproportionate segment of this [Supreme] Court's 
discretionary docket that is consistently devoted to reviewing Ninth Circuit judgments 
and to reversing them by lop-sided margins."3 The Ninth Circuit's reputation as a 
"bastion of liberalism"4 has been reinforced through political, public, and media attention 
and controversial rulings such as Newdow v. United States Congress (2002) (on the 
Pledge of Allegiance)5 and Compassion in Dying v. Washington (1996) (on physician-
assisted suicide).6 
While consensus exists within both the legal and the political science 
communities as to the existence of the Ninth Circuit's checkered reputation, little 
explanatory consensus exists for the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate. Much of the 
previous academic work has addressed the circuit's demographics: the characteristics of 
circuit size, personnel, and territory that are perceived to most contribute to the circuit's 
1 
reputation. The Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction is the largest territorial allotment amongst the 
circuit courts, covering nine states (California, Arizona, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, 
Hawaii, Alaska, Montana, and Idaho) and two territories (Guam and the Northern Marina 
Islands),7 a contributing factor in both the circuit's heavy case load and its diverse 
constituency.8 With twenty-eight authorized active judgeships, the Ninth Circuit is the 
largest federal intermediate-appellate court in terms of personnel, having eleven more 
judges than the next largest circuit.9 Furthermore, due to its size, the Ninth Circuit is 
permitted to use a limited en banc review procedure.10 En banc review normally involves 
the rehearing of a three-judge panel decision before the full circuit; the limited en banc 
review procedure employed by the Ninth Circuit requires only eleven judges: the chief 
judge and ten randomly assigned judges, who may or may not have been members of the 
original panel.11 In addition to reflecting larger questions about judicial politics,12 the 
Ninth Circuit's reputation as a far-left court is considered a prominent factor in the 
Supreme Court's review of the circuit.13 Congress has considered proposals to divide the 
circuit for decades, including that by the 1999 Commission on Structural Alternatives for 
the Federal Courts of Appeals (the White Commission) study, which recommended the 
split.14 
Much of the existing scholarship reflects a division between legal analysis (in 
which judges are generally considered to be motivated primarily by the application of 
existing law), and behavioral political science (in which judges can be considered 
political actors advancing policy considerations).15 While the debate over the motivations 
of judges can be directed towards any level of the United States' court system, it becomes 
especially noteworthy in consideration of the Ninth Circuit because the circuit's 
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perceived liberal tendencies factor into most evaluations. Scholars have used both 
quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis to assess the performance of the Ninth 
Circuit both relative to its sister circuits and to the United States Supreme Court. Most 
scholarship focuses on two primary areas of consideration: evaluating the merits of the 
Ninth Circuit's liberal reputation and judicial performance or considering the 
organizational structure of the Ninth Circuit (the number of judgeships, the limited en 
banc procedure). 
Examining the Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the Supreme Court for patterns 
among those cases offers another avenue for assessing the circuit's performance. Many 
factors relating to the Supreme Court's disposition of a case are not illuminated solely by 
the reversal statistics. Broader patterns of judicial behavior could potentially be found 
within this information. Considerations such as the relevant legal question and 
application of particular types of law, the composition of the Ninth Circuit panel, whether 
the case was reheard en banc before appeal to the Supreme Court, the vote of the 
Supreme Court justices, and whether the United States government or a government 
representative was an appellant to the case all offer potential insight into evaluating the 
Ninth Circuit's performance as an intermediate level appellate court. Examining the 
actual cases reviewed by the Supreme Court, the cases that informed Justice Scalia's 
assessment, allows for a greater understanding of the Ninth Circuit's judicial behavior 
based on the circuit's output. The circuit's output subject to Supreme Court review offers 
a fuller picture of the dynamics between the court levels than the circuit's reversal 
statistics alone. Additionally, this approach promotes further insight into the complex 
3 
relationship between the intermediate United States Courts of Appeals System and the 
United States Supreme Court at the systemic level. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Each year the Supreme Court reviews and decides with written opinion less than 
one percent (1%) of the cases submitted to it, averaging around eighty cases per year.1 In 
the October 2009 term (cases heard and decided between October 2009 and September 
2010), the Supreme Court affirmed seventeen lower court decisions and reversed sixty-
' j  
five. Of these, four decisions from the Ninth Circuit were affirmed, eleven were reversed 
or vacated.3 This 73% reversal rate is a notable improvement over the 88% reversal rate 
for the 2008 term, in which fifteen of the seventeen Ninth Circuit cases reviewed were 
reversed or vacated,4 or the 96% reversal rate in the 1996 term.5 Statistically, the 
Supreme Court is more likely to reverse a lower court decision than to affirm it.6 Yet, the 
reversal rate for the Ninth Circuit is consistently among the highest systemwide.7 Ninth 
Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain notes that collectively between the 2000 and 2009 
terms, the Ninth Circuit was reversed in 148 out of 182 cases heard by the Supreme 
Court, 72 of which were unanimous reversals.8 Judge Richard Posner's statistical 
comparison of the Ninth Circuit with its sister circuits between 1985 and 1997 
demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit leads the circuit courts in the number of summary 
reversals, non-summary reversals, and unanimous non-summary reversals.9 While Erwin 
Chemerinsky argues that the rate of Ninth Circuit reversals is consistent with the median 
of circuit court reversals nationwide;10 a 1984-2004 comparison between the Ninth 
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Circuit's reversal rate and the overall reversal rate for all courts shows that the Ninth 
Circuit's reversal rate was higher than the overall rate in all but three years.11 In twelve of 
those years, the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate exceeded the overall rate by a difference of 
greater than 5%, with five years exceeding a 20% difference.12 
While these numbers illustrate that the Ninth Circuit is more often than not 
reversed upon Supreme Court review, there is extensive debate within the scholarship as 
to the merits of assessing a circuit court on its Supreme Court reversal rate. While Posner 
and O'Scannlain find the reversal rate to be a significant problem for the Ninth Circuit,13 
Stephen Wermiel and Ninth Circuit Senior Judge Jerome Farris argue that reversal 
statistics by themselves cannot reflect accurately the performance of any court.14 Both 
Stephen Wasby and Marybeth Herald note that, because circuit courts (such as the Ninth 
Circuit) are only evaluated on the cases taken directly from their circuit, if the Supreme 
Court supports the Ninth Circuit position in a case taken from another circuit, it would 
not factor into the statistical analysis of the circuit's term.15 A study by Stefani Lindquist, 
Susan Haire, and Donald Songer suggests that the Ninth Circuit may be more closely 
observed by the Supreme Court, as they found that the Supreme Court increases its 
monitoring of circuits that it has heavily reversed in prior terms.16 They argue that 
because the Supreme Court lacks normal organizational means to control the lower 
courts, it strategically uses its review resources to maximize its control over the 
judiciary.17 They find a number of factors indicate statistically significant increases in 
Supreme Court monitoring of a circuit, including previously high Supreme Court 
reversal, large numbers of certiorari petitions, increases in en banc hearings and 
dissenting opinions, heavy reversal of district courts, and the ideological make-up of the 
7 
circuit.18 These factors support the interpretation that the Ninth Circuit may be singled 
out on the basis of reputation, as Lindquist, Haire, and Songer conclude that "the identity 
of the circuit is one indicator the Court appears to use in assessing lower court outputs."19 
Herald discusses a similar finding in her review of the Supreme Court's 1996 term, which 
suggests that the Supreme Court is "micro-managing" the Ninth Circuit.20 
The Supreme Court's discretionary docket has been advanced as an explanatory 
factor in the amount of attention the Ninth Circuit receives from the Supreme Court. The 
Ninth Circuit generates more petitions for certiorari21 than any other circuit court of 
appeal;22 which Lindquist, Haire, and Songer find results in increased Supreme Court 
auditing. Some scholars have argued that the perceived ideological conflict between the 
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court is a result of a Supreme Court shift that the Ninth 
Circuit may not be acknowledging (particularly if it has not resulted in changes to 
Supreme Court precedent).24 Herald finds that, in the cases reviewed from the Ninth 
Circuit during the 1996 term, the Ninth Circuit generally favored the individual against 
government, federal government over states, and states except in environmental cases, 
while the Supreme Court reversed in favor of government, state governments over 
federal, and individuals in cases involving property.25 Kevin Scott's argument that 
"higher courts reverse lower courts in pursuit of making broader policy statements;"26 
supports the interpretation that the Ninth Circuit is adhering collectively to a different 
judicial philosophy than the Supreme Court. This, in turn, generates Supreme Court 
attention and precedent-setting reversals. Herald suggests that "the reversed cases have 
more to say about the philosophy of the Supreme Court, which has total discretion over 
its docket."27 
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Evaluating a circuit based on its reversal rate is subject to other limitations, 
specifically that there are factors in the disposition of cases that are not considered in the 
statistical score.28 One consideration that cannot be discerned from the reversal numbers 
is whether the lower court's decision was "wrong" or "different."29 Farris maintains that 
judges issue opinions, which are matters of interpretation rather than statements of fact 
and that the Ninth Circuit only fails in its performance if it does not thoroughly consider 
the case or if it does not follow Supreme Court precedent. Scott finds that precedent 
applies less directly to cases at higher level courts due to the complexity of the cases,31 
and many Ninth Circuit cases may lack clear precedent, which would be consistent with 
Farris' argument. While this distinction can be made for every other intermediate court,32 
it does support the hypothesis that the Ninth Circuit may not necessarily be deciding 
cases "incorrectly." Chemerinsky argues that, while the Supreme Court is the final 
arbitrator of appeals in the United States, a conflicting decision between the Supreme 
Court and a circuit court does not necessarily indicate that the lower court's decision was 
incorrect in terms of legal reasoning or application.33 He contends that "it is wrong to 
equate a reversal with a mistake by the lower court."34 The lower court's decision may 
only become "wrong" after the Supreme Court rules differently.35 Herald also finds that 
there are cases in which the Supreme Court agrees with the lower court's reasoning but 
not the result which still count as reversals.36 
Another consideration in evaluating a Ninth Circuit reversal is the margin by 
which the Supreme Court reversed the decision. Chemerinsky, Farris, and Wermiel 
argue that if the Supreme Court decision was reached by a 5-4 or 6-3 majority, such a 
reversal is less likely to indicate a failure by the Ninth Circuit in deciding the case and 
9 
more likely a different application of legal principles.37 However, Posner and Scott 
address this consideration by evaluating the Ninth Circuit's high rate of unanimous 
reversals,38 with Scott finding that "the Ninth Circuit's proportion of lopsided reversals is 
greater than its proportion of reversals decided by a closer vote."39 The Ninth Circuit 
leads the circuit court of appeals in unanimous reversals.40 
Cases of inter-circuit conflict, in which two or more circuit courts of appeals 
reach different results on similar cases, may also be used to evaluate the performance of 
the Ninth Circuit.41 Circuit precedents are binding only for the district courts in that 
circuit. However, due to the importance of uniformity in federal law, cases in which two 
or more circuit courts have established different precedents are strong candidates for 
Supreme Court review.42 Though two or more circuits may share a position, only the 
circuit from which the case was taken is considered affirmed or reversed.43 Wasby's 
study of inter-circuit conflict finds that from 1990-1999, "the Ninth Circuit fared better in 
the Supreme Court's rulings on inter-circuit conflicts in cases taken from other courts of 
appeals than in Ninth Circuit cases reviewed directly."44 Wasby and Herald argue that the 
Ninth Circuit's record improves, albeit only slightly, when these cases are taken into 
account45 In cases reviewed directly from the circuit, the Ninth Circuit's position is 
sometimes shared by other circuits;46 though Herald documents some cases during the 
1996 term in which no other circuit supported the Ninth Circuit's position.47 Interpreting 
the results of the term, Herald concludes that "the cases support the argument that the 
Ninth Circuit emphasized its own decisions and viewpoints to the exclusion of a broader, 
more national approach."48 
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The Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate raises concerns because of the implications 
the rate has on the status and application of law. Michael Solimine states that, while over 
time "there seems to be a homogenization of reputations among the circuits,"49 some 
legal commentators, including attorneys and other federal judges, single the Ninth Circuit 
out as having a poor reputation.50 Arthur Hellman finds this pattern of reversals raises 
doubts about the competency and legitimacy of intermediate court judges.51 Some cases 
address issues that the Supreme Court will rule on regardless of the disposition of the 
lower court,52 but such cases do not make up the majority of Ninth Circuit decisions.53 
Because the Supreme Court reviews such a small percentage of cases, it theoretically 
gives circuit court judges the opportunity to decide cases according to their judicial 
philosophy and policy goals.54 Farris' argument that "the Supreme Court let stand as final 
99.7 percent of Ninth Circuit's 1996 cases,"55 is an indication of the limited nature of 
Supreme Court review rather than an affirmation of the Ninth Circuit's performance,56 
but it also illustrates a major concern over the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate. Because most 
Ninth Circuit decisions will not be subject to Supreme Court review, potentially 
"incorrect" decisions could stand without further consideration.57 Debates about judicial 
political activity has caught the attention of politicians and the public, such as the 
controversy over the Supreme Court's 2009 Citizens United vs. Federal Election 
Commission ruling,58 and the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate and controversial cases 
are causing considerable interest in that debate.59 
11 
The Ninth Circuit and Politics 
In assessing the behavior of circuit court judges, Scott addresses a debate between 
political scientists and legal scholars. This debate is between those who argue that judges 
are motivated by policy aims and those who argue that judges are motivated by the desire 
to make good law.60 Scott cites four factors that indicate that lower court judges are more 
interested in making good law than policy: (1) the need to maximize efficiency in the 
court system,61 (2) higher court judges hear more complex cases, which may require 
additional law,62 (3) precedent applies more directly at lower levels,63 and (4) the desire 
of lower court judges for promotion to a higher court position.64 Scott finds that size, 
workload, and ideology are significant predictors of a circuit's reversal rate and argues 
that smaller and busier circuits are less likely to be reversed because the need for 
efficiency limits the opportunity forjudges to create new policy65 A study by Frank 
Cross evaluates the circuit court of appeals using four models of judicial decision-making 
to determine which factors most influence circuit court judges.66 He determines that the 
legal model, which holds that judges make decisions through systematic application of 
law, is the most significant factor in influencing circuit court judges.67 However, Cross 
acknowledges notable evidence for the political model, which views judges as political 
actors who advance their policy preferences, even if they couch those preferences in legal 
theory.68 The remaining two models, the strategic model - which suggests that judges 
will make decisions to avoid Supreme Court reversal, and the litigant-driven model -
which suggests that litigants, not judges, drive circuit court precedent, Cross finds to be 
of little to no significance.69 Cross argues that the political science verses legal 
scholarship debate is ultimately too reductive and that judges are likely to be influenced 
by both factors, "acknowledging a material role for politics and strategy injudicial 
decision-making does not mean that legal reasoning is necessarily meaningless." 
The Ninth Circuit's liberal reputation is a fixture in the debate about whether 
judges are more motivated to create law or policy. Consensus exists within the 
scholarship that this liberal reputation exists. The debate over the liberal reputation of the 
Ninth Circuit instead centers on whether such a reputation is merited and whether that 
reputation is related to the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate.71 The circuit's liberal 
reputation dates to President Jimmy Carter, who, through the creation of ten additional 
judgeships, appointed fifteen judges to the Ninth Circuit during his presidency.72 
Wermiel asserts that the connection between the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate and 
ideology was started by President Ronald Reagan,73 who appointed four judges to the 
Supreme Court, and along with President G.H.W. Bush, fourteen Ninth Circuit judges.74 
Susan Haire's study of Ninth Circuit judicial selection finds that Reagan and Bush 
appointments were generally utilized to advance policy goals, their appointees are more 
ideologically cohesive, while appointments made by Carter and President Bill Clinton 
were generally for partisan rather than policy reasons, such as pledges to increase 
diversity in the judiciary.75 Haire notes that that Democratic appointees on the Ninth 
Circuit are more liberal than Democratic appointees on other circuits.76 Chemerinsky 
observes that, in a comparison between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, while 
the Supreme Court has justices appointed by Democratic presidents, there are no strong 
liberals currently on the Court in the tradition of William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, 
or William Douglas.77 The Ninth Circuit has comparably liberal judges, indicating that its 
liberal judges may go further left than any sitting Supreme Court justice.78 While several 
13 
scholars express reservations about evaluating the liberal-conservative orientation of 
judges based on the appointing president, due to factors such as senatorial courtesy, the 
non-partisan status of judging, and inconsistency between a judge's ideology and the 
ideology of the appointing president, it remains the most accepted evaluation of a judge's 
70 ideological preferences. 
The merits and satisfactory explanatory capabilities of the Ninth Circuit's liberal 
reputation is a source of substantial debate within the scholarship. Some scholars see the 
Ninth Circuit's liberal reputation as detrimental to the prestige of the circuit. Wermiel 
argues that poor use of statistics by politicians and the media is responsible for the Ninth 
Circuit's reputation as a "runaway liberal court;" and argues that a comprehensive 
understanding of the relationship between the Supreme Court and the circuit courts is 
needed to put the statistics in perspective.80 Wermiel also expresses concern that the 
circuit's reputation influences the public's perception of controversial Ninth Circuit 
Of 
cases. Herald finds that the ideological explanation is inconsistent with the circuit's 
current membership,82 while Haire argues that "one cannot label such a large circuit as 
being ideologically homogenous."83 In contrast, Posner argues that, if the Ninth Circuit is 
more liberal, it would explain the high reversal rate as unrelated to the circuit's 
performance.84 Herald, Wermiel, and Farris note that the ideological explanation fails to 
account for the Supreme Court's reversals of Ninth Circuit judges appointed by 
Republican presidents (who are reversed at a similar rate as Democratic-appointed 
judges), and that it overlooks the fact that most three-judge panels involve appointees 
from both parties.85 O'Scannlain also rejects the liberal hypothesis.86 In his criticism of 
the Ninth Circuit, he argues that the large numbers of unanimous reversals that the Ninth 
14 
Circuit experiences contradicts the ideological claim.87 Studies by Scott and Lindquist, 
Haire, and Songer suggest that the Supreme Court does take the circuit ideology into 
account in its review of the Ninth Circuit.88 Scott finds that while ideologically 
heterogeneous circuits are reversed less frequently, the increased ideological distance 
between the circuit court and the Supreme Court increases the number of expected 
reversals.89 Herald suggests that "the reversal rate reflects an ideological split that is more 
subtle and complicated than political partisanship,"90 which is supported to some degree 
by some of the Supreme Court reversals. Both Wermiel and Chemerinsky cite cases in 
which the Ninth Circuit took a conservative position, which was later reversed by the 
Supreme Court.91 While in some cases, the circuit may issue a broad ruling that is 
narrowed and changed by the Supreme Court without necessarily invalidating the 
arguments of the original decision.92 
The Size of the Ninth Circuit 
Congress has established thirteen circuit courts of appeal in the federal court 
system: the Federal Circuit (which has a specialized nationwide jurisdiction), the D.C. 
circuit, and eleven numbered circuit courts of appeal which are divided into exclusive 
Q1 
geographical areas. These appellate courts were originally created by the Evarts Act in 
1891, with the Tenth and Eleventh circuits being established in 1926 and 1980 
respectively.94 The Ninth Circuit is the largest of these circuit courts, both in terms of 
territory and the number of authorized judgeships.95 Some scholars hypothesize that the 
Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate can be attributed to its size and to the mechanisms, such 
as the limited en banc hearing, by which the circuit functions. Scholarship on the size of 
15 
the Ninth Circuit is frequently set against the backdrop of the continuing debate over 
whether the Ninth Circuit is too large to function properly, and if so, whether the circuit 
should be divided. 
The size of the Ninth Circuit is cited frequently as a factor in explaining the Ninth 
Circuit's high reversal rate. The Ninth Circuit handles more cases per year than any other 
circuit court.96 Herald argues that Congress' delays in filling vacancies on the Ninth 
Circuit contributes to the circuit's reversal rate because "eighteen judges [in 1997] are 
expected to do the work of twenty-eight."97 Posner argues that the size of the circuit 
affects judicial quality on the Ninth Circuit because informal norms of quality control do 
QO 
not work as well in larger groups. Posner's analysis finds that problems with the quality 
of judicial decision-making increase with the size of a circuit, and that adding judgeships 
reduces the judicial quality of the circuit.99 Some criticisms of the Ninth Circuit suggest 
that the size of the Ninth Circuit prevents the judges from maintaining circuit 
consistency, in that the Ninth Circuit may establish contradictory rulings with its own 
circuit precedent.100 However, Hellman's analysis of the Ninth Circuit's en banc process 
argues that the consistency hypothesis is unfounded, finding that the evidence indicates 
that "Ninth Circuit judges engage in extensive monitoring of their colleagues 
decisions."101 Hellman's findings that the Ninth Circuit judges extensively review circuit 
activity supports Herald's conclusion that the Ninth Circuit may be eschewing a national 
approach to focus on its own circuit precedent.102 Hellman finds that many judges on the 
Ninth Circuit are committed to the principle of panel autonomy and believe that "panels 
should be given wide leeway to resolve issues, even important ones, on which there is no 
controlling authority."103 Scott's statistical analysis concludes that "the size of the circuit 
16 
is not strongly related to the frequency of reversal,"104 and that the Ninth Circuit's 
reversal rate cannot be explained solely by its size.105 
The limited en banc procedure used only by the Ninth Circuit is frequently 
considered the most prominent size-related explanation of the circuit's reversal rate. 
Normally, en banc hearings are held after the three-judge panel has issued its ruling, 
usually at the request of other judges on the circuit.106 Judges on the circuit can initiate en 
banc procedures through a variety of means and, from 1994-1998, Ninth Circuit judges 
(who did not serve on the original panel) initiated en banc activity in 420 cases.107 The 
Supreme Court urges circuits to rehear cases en banc when the panel ruling: (1) conflicts 
1Dfi 1 AO 
with circuit precedent, (2) conflicts with Supreme Court rulings, or (3) involves 
issues of "exceptional importance."110 Studies by Wasby and Lindquist, Haire, and 
Songer suggest that rehearing a case en banc may attract Supreme Court attention.111 
Wasby also finds that many cases that are candidates for en banc hearing are cases the 
Supreme Court is likely to review anyway.112 The Ninth Circuit is permitted to use the 
limited en banc procedure through a congressional statute; provisions for full court 
review exist, but have not been exercised.113 Scott finds that the limited en banc 
procedure has a greater impact on the outcome of Ninth Circuit cases than the circuit's 
size.114 While Hellman acknowledges that the limited en banc occasionally fails to 
correct decisions that the full en banc review might, his statistical analysis indicates an 
80% probability of the limited en banc matching a full en banc.115 His results indicate that 
the limited en banc review generally supports the majority view of the circuit's judges.116 
Hellman finds that increased use of the en banc procedure does benefit the Ninth Circuit 
117 
cases during Supreme Court review. While Wasby acknowledges that Ninth Circuit en 
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banc cases reviewed by the Supreme Court fared better than Ninth Circuit panel 
decisions, he argues that there is little evidence that en banc hearings in general affect the 
Supreme Court's disposition of a case compared to only holding a panel hearing.118 
Conclusion 
The Ninth Circuit has been subject to comparatively more scholarship than its 
sister circuits. Both political scientists and legal scholars continue to explore potential 
explanations for the circuit's high reversal rate, the merits of its liberal reputation, and the 
effects, if any, of the circuit's size. No single factor cited has explained conclusively the 
Ninth Circuit's checkered reputation and years of frequent Supreme Court reversal. 
While the Ninth Circuit is reversed more often by the Supreme Court than any 
other circuit court, and has had years of extremely high reversal, the reversal rate 
functions mostly as a signal of a problem under Supreme Court review. The reversal rate 
alone lacks explanatory power. Factors such as the nature of judicial decision-making, 
inter-circuit conflict cases, and the Supreme Court's discretionary docket, reduce the 
authority of the statistical score. Farris maintains that circuit courts should not be driven 
by the risk of reversal: "the danger is not that an appellate court gets reversed, but that a 
court might let possible reversal deter decisive, full, and reasoned consideration of 
important issues."119 Similarly, in his analysis of judicial behavior, Cross finds that the 
risk of reversal has little influence on the behavior of intermediate court judges.120 
However, some scholars acknowledge, even those who reject reliance on reversal 
statistics, that the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate casts doubt upon whether the circuit 
is functioning properly. Both Cross and Scott acknowledge the division between 
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disciplines about the extent to which judges are influenced by politics.121 Cross' analysis 
concludes that, even as judges are primarily motivated by law, they are influenced, if 
i "yy  
even subconsciously, by politics. 
The Ninth Circuit is not homogenous ideologically. While the circuit's liberal 
reputation at one time could be attributed mostly to the large proportion of Carter 
appointees, many of those appointees are no longer active judges,123 and that reputation 
has persisted through the appointments of Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton, and G.W. 
Bush. The "liberal judge" theory, that holds that the Ninth Circuit's liberal reputation is 
the product of circuit dominance by a large number of liberal judges, is the most common 
manifestation of the liberal reputation assessment. The assessment suggests that the 
disconnect between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, as demonstrated by the 
high reversal rate, is a function of more liberal Ninth Circuit judges being overruled by 
more conservative Supreme Court justices. Herald's argument of a more complex 
ideological gap between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court during the 1996 term124 
and Hellman's conclusion that the Ninth Circuit is primarily internally focused125 each 
suggest a philosophical difference injudicial approach between the Ninth Circuit and the 
Supreme Court that is a more sophisticated explanation of the circuit's behavior than the 
"liberal judge" theory. 
Analysis of the effects of the Ninth Circuit's size upon its reversal rate has to be 
positioned against the backdrop of the politically contentious debate over proposals to 
divide the circuit. If the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate is primarily an effect of its 
territorial or judicial size, than some credibility attaches to the suggestion that splitting 
the circuit would improve its performance upon Supreme Court review. Posner argues 
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based on statistical evidence that the substantial size of the Ninth Circuit affects the 
quality of its judicial output.126 However, statistical analysis by Scott and Hellman 
suggests that the experiences of the Ninth Circuit cannot be reduced solely to the question 
of circuit size.127 While Scott's analysis finds the limited en banc procedure was more 
problematic than circuit size,128 Hellman argues that Ninth Circuit judges continue to 
extensively monitor circuit output and that the limited en banc review procedure 
functions largely at similar efficiency to a full en banc review.129 
Different theories relating to size, ideology, and statistical relevance have been 
addressed through qualitative and quantitative means to evaluate the reputation and 
judicial performance of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. No single element 
has been found to explain conclusively why the Ninth Circuit generally fares poorly upon 
Supreme Court review. A period study of the Ninth Circuit cases that were reviewed by 
the Supreme Court might offer insight into the relationship between the Supreme Court 
and the Ninth Circuit by looking for particular patterns among those cases. Herald's 
analysis of the 1996 term provides a substantial amount of detail relating to the cases 
reviewed by the Supreme Court, but it was an in-depth review of a notoriously difficult 
term, in which the Ninth Circuit was reversed in all but one case. This study analyzes the 
interaction between the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit across an extended period; 
rather than a detailed assessment of cases, this study looks for patterns among the 
disposition of the cases, the Supreme Court vote, the panel composition, specific legal 
questions, and whether the government was a party to the case across several years of full 
terms. This research attempts to get a broader picture of the Ninth Circuit's performance 
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CHAPTER III 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
This paper examines the relationship between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court by analyzing the Ninth Circuit cases the Supreme Court accepted for review over 
eleven Supreme Court terms, from 1994 to 2004. Supreme Court terms begin in October 
and officially conclude in September of the following year.1 Most decisions are issued by 
the end of June. This approach allows for a complete evaluation of the Ninth Circuit 
cases reviewed by the Supreme Court, those in which a writ of certiorari was granted, 
over the period of this study, rather than focusing on selected notable cases or specific 
attributes of the Supreme Court's docket. This study considers the Supreme Court's 
review under Chief Justice Rehnquist from October Term 1994, when Justice Breyer 
joined the Court, to October Term 2004, the last term served by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
The stability of the Supreme Court's membership during this period minimizes the effect 
of Supreme Court composition as an intervening variable in this analysis. 
The cases used in this study were collected from the printed version of the United 
States Reports, Volumes 513 to 545. Three volumes are published for each Supreme 
Court term covering the cases chronologically in order of decision. These are the official 
records of United States Supreme Court decisions. All cases in which a writ of certiorari 
was granted to a case originating from the Ninth Circuit were included in this data set for 
analysis. The Supreme Court reviewed 206 cases from the Ninth Circuit from the 1994 
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term through the 2004 term. 203 resulted in a Supreme Court decision, either with full 
consideration (with briefing and oral argument) or summary consideration (without 
briefing or oral argument).4 In two cases: Grimmett v. Brown 519 U.S. 233 (1996 Term) 
and Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley 537 U.S. 1 (2002 Term), the writ of certiorari was 
dismissed, and in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership 513 U.S. 18 
(1994 Term) the case was dismissed as moot. The case name and citation number, the 
Supreme Court disposition, the Supreme Court vote, the legal question considered by the 
Supreme Court, and whether the government was a party to the case as either an appellant 
or appellee were recorded from each case within the study period. This information was 
subsequently checked against the records of the Oyez Project, an online legal reference 
site from the Chicago-Kent School of Law for completeness and accuracy.5 The Ninth 
Circuit decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court were accessed from Justia.com, which 
provided the make-up of the original Ninth Circuit panel and the en banc panel 
composition if applicable.6 
This study utilizes the following variables to examine the Supreme Court's review 
of Ninth Circuit cases: 
DISPOSITION: The action taken by the Supreme Court after review of 
the Ninth Circuit case. Cases are either "Affirmed," "Reversed" 
(Reversed decisions can be remanded to the lower court), "Vacated" 
(Vacated decisions can be remanded to the lower court), "Affirmed in 
Part, Reversed in Part" (these cases can also be remanded to the lower 
court). For the purposes of this study, "Reversed" and "Vacated" are 
treated as the same disposition, as both outcomes signal Supreme Court 
disagreement with the Ninth Circuit decision. Whether a case was 
remanded to the lower court was not considered in this variable apart from 
documentation. 
VOTE: The Supreme Court vote. The majority of decisions issued by the 
Supreme Court include the votes of all nine sitting Supreme Court justices. 
Votes in which one or more justices did not participate in the decision 
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were documented by their own numeric code for the statistical analysis. 
Votes were coded from "1" indicating a 9-0 vote, to "11" indicating a 4-4 
vote. While Supreme Court rules permit justices the option to sign onto 
only selected sections of opinions, for statistical efficiency, only approval 
and dissent were considered in coding the vote for each case. Concurring 
opinions are included in the majority vote count. Per curiam decisions 
(summary reversals) are documented by their own numeric code in the 
statistical analysis. 
GOVERNMENT AS PARTY: Whether government was a party to the 
case as either an appellant or an appellee. "Government" refers to any 
form of government or government agent within the United States: this 
includes, but is not limited to, the United States as a party, any state within 
the United States, counties or cities within the United States, federal or 
state administrative agents, local law enforcement, district attorneys, or 
county officials. Cases involving Guam or U.S. territories were not coded 
as government cases. The government variable is coded "1" if the 
government is a party to the case and the Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
the government. The variable is coded "2" if the government is a party to 
the case and the Supreme Court did not rule in favor of the government. 
The variable is coded "3" if the government was not a party to the case, 
and coded "4" if the government was a party on both sides (such as a 
state-local or a federal-state) dispute. Cases in which the government files 
an amicus brief but was not actually a party to the case are coded "3;" 
while the government may have had a legal interest in the outcome it was 
not directly involved in the case. 
DUE PROCESS: Whether the legal question in the case involved Due 
Process law. For the purposes of this analysis, "due process" is defined as 
any legal matter than invokes a legal due process guarantee (this includes 
criminal procedure cases that don't explicitly cite the due process clause) 
with the government as a party to the case. Due process cases that involve 
criminal guarantees (such as the Fourth Amendment) are coded separately 
from due process cases involving civil guarantees (such as the Fifth 
Amendment "takings clause"). 
EQUAL PROTECTION: Whether the legal question in the case involved 
the Equal Protection clause. For the purposes of this analysis, "equal 
protection" is defined as any legal matter that invokes the equal protection 
guarantee in which the government is a party to the case. Civil rights 
cases involving private parties (such as employment discrimination) 
without the government as a party are not coded as equal protection cases. 
PANEL: The make-up of the original Ninth Circuit panel decision, coded 
by appointing presidential party. This study does not attempt to rate the 
ideological orientation of individual judges, it documents only whether the 
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judges on the panel were appointed by a Democratic or a Republican 
president. Appointment information was retrieved from the Federal 
Judicial Center database, which includes service information for federal 
judges, whether currently or no longer serving.7 Panel composition can 
include three judges all appointed by either Democratic presidents or 
Republican presidents, panels made up of two Democratic appointees and 
one Republican appointee, or two Republican appointees and one 
Democratic appointee. This variable focused on the composition of the 
panel that issued the opinion, dissenting panel opinions were not included 
in the analysis. Whether a panel decision was reheard en banc is also 
documented by this variable, coded "5," as the Supreme Court decision 
refers to the en banc opinion in these cases, these cases are excluded from 
panel analysis. 
EN BANC: Whether the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc prior to 
review by the Supreme Court. As the Supreme Court decision refers to 
the Ninth Circuit en banc decision on these cases, the composition of the 
original panel was excluded from the statistical analysis. 
Hypotheses 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between the Ninth Circuit 
and the Supreme Court based on the Supreme Court's review of cases originating from 
the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit has generated public and political interest due to its 
significantly high reversal rate; the most pressing explanations for the reversal rate relate 
to the Ninth Circuit's judicial performance. To best evaluate the relationship between the 
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, this study focuses on three distinct, but related 
areas, in which the Ninth Circuit may be differing substantively from the Supreme Court: 
the composition of the Ninth Circuit panel, the treatment of government appellants or 
appellees, and the application of Due Process guarantees. This study evaluates the 
following three hypotheses: 
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H I :  T h e  m o r e  D e m o c r a t i c - a p p o i n t e d j u d g e s  o n  t h e  N i n t h  C i r c u i t  p a n e l ,  t h e  m o r e  
likely the Supreme Court is to reverse the decision. 
This is an empirical test of the "liberal judge" theory. The "liberal judge" theory 
holds that the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate can be attributed to the circuit being 
dominated by liberal judges (initially Carter appointees), resulting in an ideological 
disagreement between more liberal Ninth Circuit judges and more conservative Supreme 
Court judges. This hypothesis tests the effect of political identification. While subject to 
limitations, the appointing presidential party is the most frequently accepted proxy for 
evaluating a judge's ideology.8 While this study does not attempt to define the ideologies 
of individual judges, this study considers judges appointed by Democratic presidents, 
such as Carter or Clinton, to be more liberal than judges appointed by Republican 
presidents, such as Reagan or H. W. Bush. If the "liberal judge" theory is correct, we 
should expect to see higher reversal rates for panels that include more Democratic-
appointed judges. We should expect to see panels that include more Republican judges 
reversed less frequently. 
Ninth Circuit cases are heard by panels that include active judges (judges in full 
service assigned to the Ninth Circuit,) senior judges (judges who are no longer in active 
service, but continue to hear cases,) and visiting judges (judges from other courts 
assigned to a Ninth Circuit panel.)9 Ninth Circuit panel selection procedures are designed 
to ensure that panels are composed of different combinations of judges, and that judges 
work regularly with other judges from the circuit.10 Section 3.2 of the General Orders for 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit requires that all panels include at 
least two judges assigned to the circuit, one of whom must be in active service.11 Each 
judge is expected to hear eight monthly calendars of five panels each yearly, with each 
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active judge sitting with each other active judge and each senior judge the same number 
of times over a two year period to the extent possible.12 Cases remanded to the Ninth 
Circuit after review from the Supreme Court are heard by the same panel as the original 
Ninth Circuit decision to the extent possible.13 
As a test of political ideology, the "liberal judge" theory can additionally be 
evaluated by the Supreme Court vote. While Posner finds that the Ninth Circuit leads the 
circuit courts in terms of unanimous reversals,14 if the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate can be 
attributed to differences in political ideology, we should still expect to see ideological 
splits between the liberal and conservative justices on the Supreme Court in a majority of 
cases. A large number of Supreme Court rulings that are unanimous or near unanimous 
would signal undivided Supreme Court disagreement with the Ninth Circuit ruling, 
suggesting a disagreement not based in political ideology. 
This hypothesis was tested by running a cross-tabulations analysis that used the 
Ninth Circuit panel composition as the independent variable and the Supreme Court's 
disposition of the case as the dependent variable. The Supreme Court reversed far more 
of the 203 cases than it affirmed (either in whole or in part) and the reversal statistic is the 
largest group for more detailed analysis. The Supreme Court vote was analyzed using 
frequency charts. A cross-tabulations analysis that used the Supreme Court vote as the 
independent variable and the disposition as the dependent variable was also conducted. 
The vote variable was utilized in two ways. The original vote variable was the 
Supreme Court vote as it appeared in the United States Report numerically coded; for 
statistical efficiency, only approval and dissent were measured - if a justice signed onto 
to selected parts of the majority decision or filed a concurring opinion, it was coded as an 
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approval. Most of the votes involved all nine sitting Supreme Court justices, but votes of 
4-4, 7-1,6-2 did occur infrequently throughout the period evaluated. These also were 
measured to obtain the most complete record of the Supreme Court's evaluation possible. 
A re-coded vote variable was created using the statistical analysis software to allow for 
simplified analysis of the Supreme Court vote: (Near) Unanimous (9-0, 8-1, and 8-0 
decisions), Large Margins (in which 7 justices are on one side), Clear Majority (6-3 or 6-
2 decisions), and Split Votes (5-4, 5-3,4-4 decisions). A cross-tabulations analysis, 
testing disposition as the dependent variable and re-coded Supreme Court vote as the 
independent variable was also conducted. 
H2: If the government is party to the case, the Supreme Court is more likely 
to reverse the Ninth Circuit in favor of the government. 
In Herald's study of the 1996 term, Herald argues that the Supreme Court was 
more likely than the Ninth Circuit to rule in favor of the government.15 This hypothesis is 
an extrapolation of Herald's findings to assess whether the relationship Herald found in 
the 1996 term persists across several Supreme Court terms. If the Ninth Circuit and the 
Supreme Court treat "government as appellant" cases differently, it could indicate a 
difference injudicial philosophy or judicial priority that extends beyond considering one 
court more ideologically liberal. While the "liberal judge" hypothesis tests the effect of 
judges' political orientations, this test of the treatment of government appellants in the 
Ninth Circuit and in the Supreme Court examines more complex facets of judicial 
behavior. This study treated all government appellants or appellees that appear as sole 
government party to the case equally; whether the appellant in question was the United 
States government, a state, or an administrative agency official. This treatment was 
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intended to measure how the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court respond to 
government appellants, rather than how the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court respond 
to a particular level of government. Additionally, applications of federal law originate at 
different levels of government. For example, most criminal procedure cases list the 
prison warden, a state level official, as party to the case. 
This hypothesis was tested by cross-tabulation analysis that used government as 
party as the independent variable and Supreme Court disposition as the dependent 
variable. 
H3: The Ninth Circuit is more likely to be reversed in cases that involve 
Due Process guarantees applied to criminal cases. 
The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit address a vast range of legal questions. 
The legal questions considered during the period of this study encompassed, as a small 
sample, federal agency jurisdiction, employment discrimination claims, application of 
disability law, death penalty appeals, foreign sovereignty, First Amendment questions. 
Very few of the specific legal questions were addressed frequently enough during the 
period of this study to provide a statistically rich analysis of a particular type of case. 
Analyzing the application of Due Process guarantees in criminal cases involve a variety 
of legal questions, but still permit the analysis of possible differences in how the Supreme 
Court and the Ninth Circuit treat a particular classification of cases. This hypothesis 
further tests differences injudicial philosophy between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court as based in the application of a particular type of law. 
The Due Process hypothesis was evaluated using a layered cross-tabulation 
analysis with government as party as the independent variable, Supreme Court 
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disposition as the dependent variable, and Due Process as the layer variable. Because the 
definition of the Due Process variable includes government as a party to the case, the 
government as an appellant or appellee is used as the independent variable for this 
analysis. Cases in which the government was not a party to the case, or cases in which 
the government was a party on both sides of the case were not included in this analysis. 
This study had attempted to measure the application of the Equal Protection 
clause between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court; however, there were only 
twelve cases within the study period that met the criteria for being equal protection cases. 
This is too small a sample to provide viable analysis. 
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ASSESSING THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
The Supreme Court accepted 206 cases from the Ninth Circuit between the 1994 
term and the 2004 term; the Supreme Court issued a ruling in 203 of those cases. The 
vast majority of the Ninth Circuit decisions (78.2% or 161 cases) reviewed by the 






Valid Affirmed 37 18.0 18.0 18.0 
Affirmed In Part / 5 2.4 2.4 20.4 
Reversed In Part 
Reversed/Vacated 161 78.2 78.2 98.5 
Certiorari Dismissed 3 1.5 1.5 100.0 
Total 206 100.0 100.0 
Table 1: Case Disposition of Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the Supreme Court 1994-2005 
AMhiiMl Afftmdtn RmuMVacM Carttorwl ConfeMd PartMmrMdhPwt 
Cat* Disposition 
Figure 1: Case Disposition of Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the Supreme Court 1994-2005 
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More Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the Supreme Court were decided by 
unanimous votes than by close votes, even when the cases decided by a 5-4 and by a 6-3 
vote are combined. Among the 203 cases in which the Supreme Court issued a decision, 
41.7% of those cases were decided by a 9-0 vote, compared to 14.1% of cases decided by 
a 5-4 vote. The number of unanimous Supreme Court reversals (by a 9-0 or 8-0 vote) far 
exceeds the number of "close-vote" (5-4) reversals. Most of the unanimously decided 
cases were reversals (81.4%). Twenty-six cases were reversed by per curiam opinions 
(see Table 2/Figure 2). 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 9-0 86 41.7 42.2 42.2 
8-1 13 6.3 6.4 48.5 
8-0 5 2.4 2.5 51.0 
7-2 18 8.7 8.8 59.8 
7-1 2 1.0 1.0 60.8 
7-0 1 .5 .5 61.3 
6-3 20 9.7 9.8 71.1 
6-2 2 1.0 1.0 72.1 
5-4 29 14.1 14.2 86.3 
5-3 1 .5 .5 86.8 
4-4 1 .5 .5 87.3 
Per curiam 26 12.6 12.7 100.0 
Total 204 99.0 100.0 
Missing System 2 1.0 
Total 206 100.0 
Table 2: Supreme Court vote on Ninth Circuit cases, 1994-2005 
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9-0 8-1 8-0 7-2 7-1 6*2 S-4 5-3 
Suprtme Court Vote 
Figure 2: Supreme Court vote on Ninth Circuit cases, 1994-2005 
The re-coded vote variable (which sorted the Supreme Court vote into (Near) 
Unanimous, Large Margins, Clear Majority, and Split Vote categories) demonstrates 
further patterns in the Supreme Court's review of the Ninth Circuit. Most reversals were 
decided by (near) unanimous margins (83.7%). Cases in which the judgment of the Ninth 
Circuit was affirmed were more likely to be decided by a split vote (35.5%) or a clear 
majority vote (31.8%) than by a (near) unanimous or large margin vote (see Table 3). 
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Vote - 4 Categories 
(Near) Large Clear 
Unanimous Margin Majority Split Total 
Case Affirmed Count 13 6 7 11 37 
Disposition % within Vote 12.5% 28.6% 31.8% 35.5% 20.8% 
Affirmed In Part / Count 3 0 1 1 5 
Reversed In Part % within Vote 2.9% .0% 4.5% 3.2% 2.8% 
Reversed/Vacated Count 87 15 14 19 135 
% within Vote 83.7% 71.4% 63.6% 61.3% 75.8% 
Certiorari Dismissed Count 1 0 0 0 1 
% within Vote 1.0% .0% .0% .0% .6% 
Total Count 104 21 22 31 178 
% within Vote 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 3: Case Disposition by Vote 
The findings relating to case disposition are consistent with the Ninth Circuit's 
reputation. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed or vacated more of the Ninth 
Circuit decisions than it affirmed. The reversal rate is more of a signal than a defining 
statistic. It has been argued that, in terms of reversal, the Ninth Circuit potentially may 
not be distinct from other appellate courts;1 the Supreme Court generally reverses more 
cases than it affirms.2 As the Supreme Court's discretionary docket allows the Court 
complete control over the cases it accepts for review, most of its opinions aim to clarify a 
rule of law or to correct what the Court perceives as a wayward ruling.3 However, as the 
Supreme Court averages around eighty cases per year,4 the 206 cases accepted from the 
Ninth Circuit during the eleven year period of this study support the interpretation that 
the Ninth Circuit generates a substantial amount of attention from the Supreme Court. 
Frequent review and reversal reflects poorly upon the Ninth Circuit. Even if, to some 
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degree, reversal is consistent with the expectations of higher court review, the Ninth 
Circuit occupies a considerable portion of the Supreme Court's caseload. 
The proportion of unanimous reversals is a more revealing statistic than the 
reversal rate as a means of evaluating the Ninth Circuit's performance. The Rehnquist 
Supreme Court was ideologically diverse, and generally perceived as split politically. If 
the majority of the Supreme Court reversals were by 5-4 or 6-3 votes (along ideological 
lines), the argument could be sustained that the reversal rate is a function of ideology 
rather than performance. However, even when the number of cases decided by 5-4 and 
6-3 Supreme Court votes were combined, the Ninth Circuit was more frequently 
overturned by unanimous decisions. Unanimous reversals, which require collective 
agreement from the ideologically diverse Supreme Court justices, signal a strong 
disagreement in legal reasoning rather than a disagreement in political ideology between 
the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. The frequency of unanimous reversals 
weakens the argument that the difference between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court can be expressed as a function of politics. 
The cross-tabulations analysis of the Ninth Circuit panel composition indicates 
that the inclusion of Republican-appointed judges on a panel does not decrease the 
incidence of the Supreme Court reversing the Ninth Circuit panel. There were 52 cases 
in this study in which the Ninth Circuit panel was composed entirely of Democratic-
appointed judges. These panels were reversed in 76.9% of cases. The reversal rate is 
similar for the 75 panels comprised of two Democratic-appointed judges and one 
Republican-appointed judge which were reversed in 81.3% of cases, and the 52 panels of 
two Republican-appointed judges and one Democratic-appointed judge, which were 
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reversed in 82.7% of cases. While a notable drop in the reversal rate exists for panels of 
entirely Republican-appointed judges (60%), there were only 10 such panels, not reheard 
en banc, during the period tested in this study, which is too small a sample from which to 
derive statistically meaningful results (see Table 4/Figure 3). 
Panel, Bv Appointing Presidential Party 
2 Democrat- 1 Democrat-
3 Appointed, 1 Appointed, 2 3 
Democrat- Republican- Republican- Republican Reheard 
Appointed Appointed Appointed -Appointed En Banc Total 
Case Affirmed Count 11 10 9 4 3 37 
Disposition % within Panel 21.2% 13.3% 17.3% 40.0% 21.4% 18.2% 
Affirmed In Part / Count 1 3 0 0 1 5 
Reversed In Part % within Panel 1.9% 4.0% .0% .0% 7.1% 2.5% 
Reversed/Vacated Count 40 61 43 6 10 160 
% within Panel 76.9% 81.3% 82.7% 60.0% 71.4% 78.8% 
Certiorari Dismissed Count 0 1 0 0 0 1 
% within Panel .0% 1.3% .0% .0% .0% .5% 
Total Count 52 75 52 10 14 203 
% within Panel 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 4: Cross-tabulation Table: Case Disposition by Panel Make-up 
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100* 
3 Democrat- 2 Democrat-
Appointed Appointed, 1 
RepuMcarv Apposed 
3 Repubftcarv Reheard En Banc 
Appointed 
Panel, By Appointing Presidential Party 
Figure 3: Case Disposition by Panel Make-up 
Fourteen panel decisions were reheard en banc by the Ninth Circuit prior to 
Supreme Court review throughout the period of this study. These cases were omitted 
from the statistical tests on panel composition because the Supreme Court's ruling 
applied to the en banc decision rather than the original panel decision. As a group, this 
sample is too small for statistically significant analysis, but a breakdown of the panel 
composition indicates that of the fourteen cases reheard en banc: 1 case was originally 
decided by a panel of three Democratic-appointed judges, 1 case was originally decided 
by a panel with 2 Democratic-appointed judges and 1 Republican-appointed judge, 9 
cases were from panels of 2 Republican-appointed judges and 1 Democratic-appointed 
judges, and 3 cases were originally decided by panels of three Republican-appointed 
judges. The Supreme Court reversed ten of the cases reheard en banc by the Ninth 
Circuit. 
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In order for the "liberal judge" hypothesis to be demonstrated, an inverse 
relationship should exist between the Ninth Circuit panel composition and the Supreme 
Court's disposition of the case. As the number of Republican-appointed judges on the 
panel increases, the reversal rate should decrease. While the number of panels composed 
entirely of Republican-appointed judges was not sufficient for statistically relevant results 
(there were ten throughout the period of the study), an ample number of cases from 
panels composed entirely of Democratic-appointed judges, panels of 2 Democratic-
appointed judges and 1 Republican-appointed judge, and 2 Republican-appointed judges 
and 1 Democratic-appointed judge were documented to observe the relationship between 
panel composition and the reversal rate. The reversal rate is consistent across the 
different panel compositions, panels composed of 2 Republican-appointed judges and 1 
Democrat-appointed judge are reversed at the same (slightly but not statistically 
significantly higher) rate as panels composed entirely of Democratic-appointed judges. 
While the comparable lack of panels made up entirely by Republican-appointed judges 
(10 panels composed of 3 Republican-appointed judges verses 52 panels composed of 3 
Democratic-appointed judges) suggests a prevalence of Democratic-appointed judges in 
the circuit, this is a function of demographics rather than an explanation of judicial 
performance. The results of the cross-tabulations analysis indicate, assuming 
Democratic-appointed judges are accepted as being more liberal than Republican-
appointed judges, that panel composition does not necessarily improve the Ninth 
Circuit's performance under Supreme Court review. Even with more Democratic-
appointed judges in the circuit, this test should demonstrate a difference in the reversal 
rate between panels with a majority of Republican-appointed judges and panels with a 
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majority of Democratic-appointed judges. The consistency of the reversal rate across 
panel composition weakens the political ideology argument as an explanation for the 
Ninth Circuit's performance. It also indicates that the "liberal judge" hypothesis, that the 
Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate is a function of too many liberal judges, does not 
withstand scrutiny statistically. 
The consistency of the reversal rate across different types of panel composition 
and the proportion of unanimous Supreme Court reversals indicates that the possible 
disconnect between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court is more complex than 
simply a conflict between a conservative-dominated Supreme Court and a liberal-
dominated Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. A unanimous reversal demonstrates that, 
across ideological lines, the Supreme Court expresses significant disagreement with the 
Ninth Circuit's decision. Furthermore, panels dominated by Republican-appointed 
judges are reversed at a similar rate as panels dominated by Democratic-appointed 
judges. This indicates that the "liberal judge" hypothesis, taken as a function of 
ideological explanation, cannot account for the frequency of Supreme Court reversal. 
A distinction should be made between an ideological explanation of judicial 
behavior and a philosophical one. Based on the results of this statistical analysis, framing 
the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate in ideological terms (Democrat-appointee vs. 
Republican-appointee, liberal vs. conservative) does not adequately explain its poor 
performance under Supreme Court review. The relationship between the Ninth Circuit 
and the Supreme Court cannot be reduced to disagreement between a Democratic-
appointment dominated circuit court and a Republican-appointment dominated high 
court. However, liberal and conservative differences in judicial behavior can be 
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exercised in non-ideological (non-partisan) ways, such as how the Supreme Court and the 
Ninth Circuit approach different types of legal questions. A substantial difference in 
judicial philosophy could explain how the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate crosses 
ideological lines. 
Based on the cross-tabulations analysis, when the government (federal, state, 
county, or local) as a party or a government representative was a party to a case, the 
Supreme Court frequently reversed the Ninth Circuit in favor of the government. 92% of 
cases in which the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government were cases in which 
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Cases in which the Supreme Court ruled 
against the government were more evenly split between affirmed Ninth Circuit decisions 
(41.5%) and reversed Ninth Circuit decisions (53.7%) (see Table 5). 
Government Party 
Government Government No 
Party, Party, Government 
Prevailed Against Party Total 
Case Affirmed Count 8 17 10 35 
Disposition % within Party 7.1% 41.5% 22.7% 17.7% 
Affirmed In Part / Count 1 2 2 5 
Reversed In Part % within Party .9% 4.9% 4.5% 2.5% 
Reversed/Vacated Count 104 22 31 157 
% within Party 92.0% 53.7% 70.5% 79.3% 
Certiorari Dismissed Count 0 0 1 1 
% within Party .0% .0% 2.3% .5% 
Total Count 113 41 44 198 
% within Party 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 5: Cross-tabulation Table: Case Disposition with Government Appellant or Appellee 
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The results of this analysis support the argument from Herald's study of the 1996 
term.5 The Supreme Court is much more favorable to the government appellant than the 
Ninth Circuit. In the vast majority of cases in which the Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
the government, it reversed the Ninth Circuit. When the Supreme Court ruled against the 
government, the Ninth Circuit's performance was more evenly split between decisions 
affirmed and decisions reversed. As a broader pattern of judicial behavior, the Ninth 
Circuit appears to be inclined largely to disfavor the government. The Supreme Court 
frequently counters this approach, as demonstrated by the correlation between Supreme 
Court rulings favorable to the government appellant or appellee that were cases in which 
the Ninth Circuit was reversed. When the Supreme Court ruling is not favorable to the 
government appellant or appellee, the percentage of cases in which the Ninth Circuit is 
reversed decreases significantly. This further suggests the possibility that the original 
Ninth Circuit ruling was not favorable to government, as these cases are upheld more 
frequently when the Supreme Court rules against the government appellant or appellee 
than when the Supreme Court rules in the government's favor. 
The substantial difference in the treatment of government appellants and appellees 
between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court is supportive of a difference injudicial 
philosophy argument. Without resorting to an overtly partisan distinction, the Supreme 
Court significantly favors government appellants, frequently reversing the Ninth Circuit 
in cases in which the original Ninth Circuit decision presumably was not favorable to the 
government. 
Noted as recently as the 2010 term, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit 
frequently clash over the treatment of criminal procedure cases.6 Examining the 
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application of the Due Process clause during the period of this study allows for insight 
into the differences between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court on the application 
of legal principles. While the definition of criminal Due Process, that the case invokes a 
legal due process guarantee with the government as a party to the case, is sufficiently 
broad to encompass a range of different legal questions, it is specific enough in its focus 
to illustrate if differences injudicial approach exist. 79 cases involved the application of 
a due process guarantee in a criminal procedure case. In the vast majority of these cases 
(70 cases, 88.6%), the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. In nearly all cases (63 
of 65 cases, or 96.9%) that involved a criminal procedure application of a due process 
guarantee where the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government appellant or 
appellee, the Ninth Circuit decision was reversed or vacated. Cases that involved a 
criminal procedure application of due process not ruled in favor of the government were 
more evenly split, six cases affirmed, seven cases reversed (see Table 6). 
Does Case Involve Due Process Clause 
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Table 6: Cross-tabulation Table: Case Disposition by Government Party in Due Process Cases 
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The Supreme Court's rejection of the Ninth Circuit's approach in due process 
related cases signals a strong disagreement between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court injudicial approach. While Due Process law is not overtly partisan in nature, 
differences in criminal procedure cases can be defined in liberal and conservative terms. 
Consistent with the differences between the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit in their 
approach towards government appellants and appellees, the differences injudicial 
behavior demonstrated by the Due Process tests suggests a philosophical gap between the 
courts that cannot be defined in ideological terms. 
The results of this analysis indicate that the relationship between the Ninth Circuit 
and the Supreme Court is more complicated than the liberal Ninth Circuit reputation 
permits at face value. The consistency of reversal across panel composition and the 
frequency of unanimous reversal signal that the disparity between the Ninth Circuit and 
the Supreme Court is not simply a function of the "liberal justice" hypothesis. It could 
indicate another manifestation of the Ninth Circuit's liberalism that is more sophisticated 
than a dominance of liberal justices. Strong reversal statistics for the analysis of 
government as a party to the case and the application of the due process clause indicate a 
substantial difference in approach between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court on 
these types of cases. 
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Previous studies of the Ninth Circuit have focused on analyzing different 
characteristics of the circuit court as explanatory variables for the Ninth Circuit's 
controversial reputation. Much of the scholarship focuses on two primary explanations 
for the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate: 1) the Ninth Circuit is the largest appellate court 
in terms of both territory and authorized judgeships, and 2) the Ninth Circuit's reputation 
as a liberal court. The size explanation essentially addresses the functionality of the 
circuit, directly or indirectly evaluating whether the Ninth Circuit should be split. The 
question of the Ninth Circuit's liberal reputation highlights differences between the Ninth 
Circuit and the Supreme Court that may be contributing to the Ninth Circuit's frequent 
reversal by the Supreme Court. The results of this study indicate a pronounced difference 
injudicial behavior between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court that suggests that 
the circuit's output is a very strong explanation for the Ninth Circuit's high reversal rate. 
The cases reviewed in this study reveal significant differences between the Ninth Circuit 
and the Supreme Court in their respective approaches towards applying law. 
This study examined the cases from the Ninth Circuit reviewed by the Supreme 
Court during an eleven-year period of consistent Supreme Court membership to 
determine whether the cases highlighted particular patterns of judicial behavior. This 
study focused on three different aspects of these cases: 1) the composition of the Ninth 
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Circuit panel, to test whether the composition of Democrat-appointed or Republican-
appointed judges on the panel affected the reversal rate; 2) the presence of government or 
a government representative as appellant or appellee on the case, to assess if there was a 
difference between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court in their respective treatment 
of government interests; and 3) the application of the due process clause, to test 
differences between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court in their respective 
approaches towards a type of law. The results from this analysis suggest that the 
relationship between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court is more complex than the 
political reputation of the Ninth Circuit implies. 
The Ninth Circuit's liberal reputation is frequently defined as a function of 
political (rather than legal) ideology. The "liberal judge" theory stems from President 
Carter's fifteen Ninth Circuit appointments, and it attributes the Ninth Circuit's frequent 
reversal to a political conflict with a Supreme Court composed mostly of Republican-
appointed justices. The theory, however, does not hold up to review. During the 1994-
2005 period of this study, the number of unanimous Supreme Court reversals far 
exceeded the 5-4 or 6-3 reversals that would be consistent with an ideological 
explanation. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate is consistent across different 
panel compositions. These results demonstrate that the political definitions of liberal and 
conservative (viewed as a Democrat vs. Republican conflict) cannot adequately explain 
the differences between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court. However, this study 
indicated notable differences between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court in their 
treatment of government appellants or appellees and in their application of the due 
process guarantees, which highlights liberal and conservative judicial (or philosophical) 
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differences. The Supreme Court is far more likely than the Ninth Circuit to support the 
government's position when the government appears as a party to the case. When the 
Supreme Court favored the government's position, it reversed the Ninth Circuit in 92% of 
cases; the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate improves substantially when the Supreme Court 
ruled against the government appellant. In 88.6% of cases invoking a due process 
protection, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's position; the majority of these 
cases were reversed by the Supreme Court in favor of government. 
As supported by the statistical tests in treatment of government as a party and the 
application of Due Process law, significant judicial philosophy differences exist between 
the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court. These differences exist across party lines. The 
treatment of government appellants and the application of due process guarantees are 
concepts of judicial behavior that are not strictly defined in partisan terms. In not 
favoring a government appellant or in extending a due process guarantee, the Ninth 
Circuit may be exercising a "liberal" philosophy without being representative of either 
appointing presidential party. The judicial approach favored by the Ninth Circuit may 
apply broadly to the circuit's judges independent of the judge's political identification, as 
indicated by the consistency in reversal rate across different panel compositions. 
Additionally, because a circuit's output is heavily influenced by its own precedent, unless 
governed by existing Supreme Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit may be applying a 
technically "correct" approach to law which conflicts with the Supreme Court's approach 
to the same legal question.1 
A difference injudicial philosophy between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme 
Court, as evidence by the Ninth Circuit's "liberal" outcomes towards government 
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appellants and the due process cases suggests a more complex distinction between the 
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court than the "liberal judge" theory allowed. The 
philosophical, rather than political (or ideological) explanation of the Ninth Circuit's 
"liberal" approach and the Supreme Court's "conservative" approach explains how Ninth 
Circuit panels composed primarily of Republican-appointed judges are reversed at a 
similar rate as panels composed mostly of Democratic-appointed judges. It also accounts 
for the frequency of unanimous reversals by the Supreme Court. The philosophical 
difference also indicates that politicizing the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate has little overall 
benefit, because the Republican-appointed judges are part of the Ninth Circuit's "liberal" 
problem. While this explanation provides a greater understanding of the relationship 
between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court, it also indicates that if corrective 
measures to lower the Ninth Circuit's reversal rate are necessary, such a shift will not be 
accomplished primarily by balancing the composition of judges. 
This study approached the question of the Ninth Circuit's judicial reputation by 
focusing on the Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by the Supreme Court. By examining all 
the cases accepted for review by the Supreme Court, this study discovered patterns within 
the cases rather than focusing on broad reversal statistics or notable cases. Further 
studies can apply this approach towards the other regional circuit courts of appeal, to 
contrast the relationship between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court to the 
relationship between its sister circuits and the Supreme Court. A study on the effects of 
panel composition can apply the same approach used to test the "liberal judge" 
hypothesis here to other circuit courts to examine the relationship between judicial 
partisan identification and the circuit's reversal rate. Further research should also be 
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directed towards the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. While the ideological explanation 
does not withstand statistical scrutiny, further assessment of the philosophical differences 
suggested by this paper is merited to understand the relationship between the Ninth 
Circuit, the Supreme Court, and the other circuit courts. 
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LIST OF NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES, 1994-2005 
The following table lists the judges who served in the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in either an active circuit judge or senior circuit judge capacity (or both) during 
the period of this study. This list does not include the judges whose service to the Ninth 
Circuit concluded prior to 1994, or who were appointed after 2005. 








Chambers, Richard Eisenhower 1954 1976 1994 
Merrill, Charles Eisenhower 1959 1974 1996 
Browning, James Kennedy 1961 2000 2012 
Wright, Eugene Nixon 1969 1983 2002 
Kilkenny, John Nixon 1969 1971 1995 
Cho, Herbert Nixon 1971 1984 2004 
Goodwin, Alfred Nixon 1971 1991 -
Wallace, Clifford Nixon 1972 1996 -
Sneed, Joseph Nixon 1973 1987 2008 
Hug, Procter Carter 1977 2002 -
Tang, Thomas Carter 1977 1993 1995 
Fletcher, Betty Carter 1979 1998 -
Schroeder, Mary Carter 1979 2011 -
Skopil, Otto Carter 1979 1986 -
Farris, Joseph Carter 1979 1995 -
Alarcon, Arthur Carter 1979 1992 -
Pregerson, Harry Carter 1979 - -
Ferguson, Warren Carter 1979 1986 2008 
Poole, Cecil Carter 1979 1996 1997 
Nelson, Dorothy Carter 1979 1995 -
Canby, William Carter 1980 1996 -
Boochever, Robert Carter 1980 1986 2011 
Norris, William Carter 1980 1994 1997 
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Reinhardt, Stephen Carter 1980 - -
Beezer, Robert Reagan 1984 1996 2012 
Hall, Cynthia Reagan 1984 1997 2011 
Wiggins, Charles Reagan 1984 1996 2000 
Brunetti, Melvin Reagan 1985 1999 2009 
Kozinski, Alex Reagan 1985 - -
Noonan, John Reagan 1985 1996 -
Thompson, David Reagan 1985 1998 2011 
O'Scannlain, Diarmuid Reagan 1986 - -
Leavy, Edward Reagan 1987 1997 -
Trott, Stephen Reagan 1988 2004 -
Fernandez, Ferdinand H.W. Bush 1989 2002 -
Rymer, Pamela H.W. Bush 1989 - 2011 
Nelson, Thomas H.W. Bush 1990 2003 2011 
Kleinfeld, Andrew H.W. Bush 1991 2010 -
Hawkins, Michael Clinton 1994 2010 -
Tashima, Atsushi Clinton 1996 2004 -
Thomas, Sidney Clinton 1996 - -
Silverman, Barry Clinton 1998 - -
Graber, Susan Clinton 1998 - -
McKeown, Margaret Clinton 1998 - -
Wardlaw, Kim Clinton 1998 - -
Fletcher, William Clinton 1998 - -
Fisher, Raymond Clinton 1999 - -
Gould, Ronald Clinton 1999 - -
Paez, Richard Clinton 2000 - -
Berzon, Marsha Clinton 2000 - -
Tallman, Richard Clinton 2000 - -
Rawlinson, Johnnie Clinton 2000 - -
Clifton, Richard G.W. Bush 2002 - -
Bybee, Jay G.W. Bush 2003 - -
Callahan, Consuelo G.W. Bush 2003 - -
Bea, Carlos G.W. Bush 2003 - -
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